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ABSTRACT: In Against Individualism, Henry Rosemont argues against a contemporary 
Western concept of self that takes rational autonomy to be the “core” of what it means to be 
a person. Rational autonomy is thought to be the only essential feature of this core self, 
endowing us with an independent existence and moral framework to act accordingly—as 
independent, rational, autonomous individuals. In marked contrast, and drawing from the 
Analects of Confucius, Rosemont defines personhood as consisting of social roles and their 
correlative responsibilities. We are persons relationally, only in virtue of the roles that 
interdependently connect us to each other. Rosemont holds that the independent self is a 
chimera that leads to a problematic ethic where our connection to others is undermined 
instead of seen as central to who we are and how we should treat others. I argue that social 
roles are also chimeras that are constructed instead of metaphysically given. That is, while 
we are essentially social, how this plays out is variable and contingent. Moreover, I argue 
that we are essentially self-aware subjects—or embodied selves—whose personal experience 
is uniquely our own and inescapably filled with otherness. Both individualizing and 
socializing aspects of self are necessary as well as interdependent; moreover, favouring one 
over the other has both positive and negative consequences. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
For much of his life, Henry Rosemont was committed to teaching Confucian 
philosophy in a way he thought demonstrated its superiority to Western philosophies 
that define personhood in terms of qualities we possess in-and-of-ourselves instead in 
terms of our relatedness to others. The full title of Henry Rosemont’s most recent 
book—Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of 
Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion—reveals its overarching thesis. He states his 
book’s purpose early on by saying, “I will first attempt to show that the view of 
human beings as most fundamentally free and rational, autonomous individual selves 
is almost certainly false, and more than that, mischievous: its celebration and defense 
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of freedom comes at the expense of social justice, and peace” (Rosemont 2015, xii). 
Rosemont argues that the early Confucian view of personhood, which takes personal 
identity to consist exclusively of the social roles that bind us morally to others, offers 
a radically different and far preferable view. He states that, when “suitably modified 
for contemporary circumstances and sensibilities”, the Confucian view should 
supplant the traditional Western view that takes personal identity to be grounded in 
qualities that we have in-and-of-ourselves, such as self-awareness, reason, and 
autonomy.  
Although Rosemont goes on in his final work to tackle many other—political, 
social, and religious—issues, I will focus on this question of personal identity and its 
moral implications. More specifically, I will compare the Western individualistic 
view of self that Rosemont holds is false, mischievous, and worthy of being discarded 
altogether, with the Confucian social view, arguing instead that personal identity 
consists of an irreducible unity of subjective experience and objective content. 
Without contradiction, the self can be thought of as entailing an embodied awareness 
that has both individualizing and socializing features that interdependently interact. 
More specifically, embodied consciousness provides the medium for the formative 
social experiences out of which our personal identities are constructed. Both of these 
features are necessary, even in cultures that favour one feature over the other. I will 
also discuss how Confucian and Western views of self both have positive and 
negative implications, and how in both cases the negative implications result from the 
nature of the self being conceived in a mutually exclusive manner, i.e., as only in 
individualistic terms in the West and as only in social terms for Confucius.  
 
2.  ROSEMONT’S TARGET:  
THE WESTERN INDIVIDUALISTIC CONCEPT OF SELF 
 
In “On the Existence of the Individual Self, and Self Identity”, Chapter Three of 
Rosemont’s book, he sets up the West’s general understanding of personal identity by 
stating: 
 
The idea of the individual self, based on self-awareness that entails rationality, is one of 
the most deeply rooted constructs in the history of Western intellectual history. From its 
origins in ancient Greece in the tripartite nature of the soul through the Judaic-Christian 
unitary version thereof it has played a major role in shaping our sense of who and what 
we are, and how, therefore, we ought to live our lives, interact with our fellows, and 
shape the institutions in which we live together. (Rosemont 2015, 33)  
 
This notion of the self, based on self-awareness, was clearly entailed in Descartes’ 
Meditations, where we find that the only “thing” we can know with certainty is that 
we exist as a “thinking” being. Stated in the first person to capture the inescapably 
subjective nature of experience, the only indubitable truth I can find—after finding 
that the content of all of my experience can be doubted—is that I am, I exist 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 9.1 (2018)  BOCKOVER 
 
99 
(Descartes 1641, “Second Meditation”).1 This experience of my “self” alone, as a 
“thing which thinks” or more accurately as a being who reflectively can ask questions 
about what I can know about what I think, reveals a truth that is foundational to self-
awareness itself: that I most essentially exist as being who has (cognitive) experiences 
and core to this, a sense of self.  
 The role of reason is clearly central in the history of Western philosophy. Plato 
spoke of contemplation as the way to gain true knowledge (Plato Republic, VI.486a). 
Even Aristotle, who was far more committed to empirical observation, defined 
persons as “rational animals” distinguished from other non-human animals by virtue 
of our deliberative capacities (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 1.13). However, Kant 
represents Rosemont’s target even more, defining us, in Rosemont’s words, as 
“fundamentally free and rational, autonomous individual selves”. For Kant, a person 
is fundamentally self-legislating or self-governing, which rests on the a priori 
capacity to reason and act autonomously or of one’s own volition (Kant 1797, 
Metaphysic of Morals). Moreover, we have these abilities in-and-of-ourselves, not 
because they are socially conferred on us. This concept of self is the one Rosemont 
mainly takes issue with in his book Against Individualism.  
 
3. CONCERNING ROSEMONT’S “ON THE EXISTENCE  
OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF, AND SELF IDENTITY” 
 
As far as being a person is concerned, I think Rosemont is correct in claiming that 
there is no independent “core self”. I must clarify my view, however: There is no core 
self that can mean anything to us independent of how we conceive it. The significance 
attached to what it means to be a person will depend on how we conceive it, but it 
does not follow that what we are thinking about has no independent reality. We 
cannot know anything without thinking about the thing we are trying to know, and to 
that extent that “thing” is a constructed concept.2 For empirical objects, we can use 
observation to know them. But for “things” not conceived as being empirical—such 
as the above “core self”—some hold (such as Descartes and Kant) that they may be 
understood, or their existence “justified,” on metaphysical grounds. As we will now 
see though, others (such as Hume, the Buddhists, and Rosemont) see such “things” as 
at best articles of faith and at worst bad ideas that have led people astray, even 
catastrophically.3    
                                                
1 The full title, “Second Meditation: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, and that it is More Easily 
Known than the Body”, is often summarized by the dictum, cogito ergo sum or “I think, therefore I 
am.”  
2 This is reminiscent of Kant’s insight that knowledge is of phenomena only, as opposed to noumena or 
the “thing-in-itself” (Kant 1781, Critique of Pure Reason, A369). 
3 For example, Marx referred to (e.g., theological) religion, including the faith we are supposed to have 
in an everlasting (immaterial) “God” and “soul”, as one of the most oppressive institutions “made by 
man”. In response, I suggest considering that Marx’s “materialist” account of history was not only 
idealistic, but has been responsible for bringing about the death of many millions of people. 
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 Rosemont never favoured transcendental thinking, as one can tell from the wealth 
of his writings and presentations. His reference to the self as a “chimera”—an unreal, 
fanciful creature of the imagination that also has connotations of being ugly or 
grotesque—is very apt given his Confucian bent. For Rosemont, the metaphysical 
idea of self is not only no good, it also leads to harm. Buddhists present a similar 
belief with their idea of No Self, a heretical rejection of the Hindu idea of Atman or 
the “Self” conceived as the divine essence or nonmaterial “soul” in every creature 
(Bhagavad Gita, 2.11-53). 4  Buddhism speaks to the problem with the Hindu 
essentialist view of Self in many places; but mainly, it is concerned with the way the 
concept creates the very attachments (to Self) that give rise to suffering (Majjhima 
Nikaya, 1.22). British empiricist David Hume also argued that personal identity is not 
real. The self is just an idea or “fiction of the imagination” that follows from or is 
connected with our experiences, instead of being an unchanging (self-identical) 
essence required for experience to be possible in the first place (Hume 1740, Part 
IV.VI). Despite their differences, however, the main implication for self-identity that 
these sceptical views hold in common is this: There is no essential, unchanging 
individual self that exists in-itself, independent of context and relatedness. 
 Rosemont is not just espousing such a view about personal identity in Against 
Individualism. He states,  
 
But if the individual self is a chimera, then moral and political theories based on it as a 
grounding concept may well be misconceived, and consequently we may need some new 
(or very old) ideas of who and what we are, how we ought to live our lives, interact with 
our fellows, and shape the institutions in which we live together. (Rosemont 2015, 33)  
 
Rosemont’s solution to the West’s misguided individualism is to adopt a Confucian 
view of “who and what we are”, where being a person means being a nexus of 
relationships and roles appropriate to them. The five “basic” relationships are as 
follows (modernized to make sense in our contemporary world): parent to child, older 
to younger sibling (or relation), spouse to spouse, official to citizen, and benefactor to 
beneficiary (or for Mencius, friend to friend).5 This Confucian view differs from the 
Buddhist concept of No Self in that the Confucian self is constituted by our most 
basic relationships and responsibilities. We have a self (instead of No Self) that is 
defined by our most basic relationships. In my case, I am my parents’ middle 
daughter and the mother of my four children. I am both an older and younger sibling 
because I have both a younger and older sibling. I am a spouse to my spouse, to 
whom I have been married for over 26 years. I am a citizen of the USA and currently 
                                                
4 The Bhagavad Gita contrasts this notion of Atman with the personal self or living person (jiva), 
which is not who we really are. Our falsely identifying with our personal (embodied) existence leads 
not to moksha or liberation from the cycle of rebirth (samsara), but rather, to its continuation. 
5 In Polishing the Chinese Mirror, a collection of essays in honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr. edited by 
Marthe Chandler and Ronnie Littlejohn, I presented a similar hierarchy or relations in my contribution 
called “The Virtue of Freedom” (Chandler & Littlejohn 2008, 127-145). 
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a resident of the state of California. I am a teacher because I have students, and I am a 
colleague to others who also teach at Humboldt State University.  
This Confucian view of self has two main features. First, I am the person I am 
because of my relationships. I could not be a daughter without parents, a mother 
without children, a sibling without siblings, a spouse without a spouse, and the like. 
In other words, my identity as a person is conferred upon me by others instead of 
being something I possess in-and-of-myself. As such, I am a not an individual but I 
am a social being. Second, as my relationships change over time, I change over time. 
The example that I present here with love and gratitude is that I am a teacher of 
philosophy in large part because of my teacher, Henry Rosemont, Jr. I was Henry’s 
student, trained in the discipline and enriched as a person along the way. I became a 
teacher because Henry helped to teach me how to be one, and now I am a committed 
teacher to my students in turn. With Henry’s passing—with the loss of my teacher, 
mentor, and friend—I have become a different person. But losing Henry does not 
mean that I lose the part of me that exists because of him. We are established as 
persons by the formative relationships that meaningfully continue to impact and 
transform our lives.  
 
4.  MY CRITIQUE OF ROSEMONT’S EXCLUSIVELY SOCIAL VIEW 
OF SELF OR PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
I hold then, that there is no essential, unchanging individual self that exists in-itself, 
independent of context and relatedness. Let me clarify once again: there is no such 
self that exists for us that is free from interpretation, or that would make any moral 
sense without having its significance shaped by how we think and what we value. 
While thinking and valuing are universal human capacities, how we think and what 
we value are both culture-specific and meant to apply to a world populated with 
others. Our world is necessarily context-dependent in resting on such culturally 
transmitted and socially directed values and beliefs. In a mainstream Western context, 
the belief in an individual self, conceived as rational and autonomous, is central to our 
vision of who we are and what we ought to value. But this is only a partial account of 
what personhood may entail.  
To spell this out more fully, I am sympathetic with Rosemont’s view that such a 
“core self” is an abstraction, or a construct or concept that may be used for ill, but I 
do not believe that this view of self as described—as exclusively devoid of social 
content and relatedness—is accurate. Once a proper account is given, the more 
specific role that rational autonomous thought serves in establishing who and what we 
are as persons can be brought to light, and it is not as problematic as Rosemont 
claims.  
Rosemont takes our roles to be real and the rational autonomous self to be a 
chimera, but let’s look at this “problem” more closely. The core self in principle 
could consist of any number of things that we think are essential to personhood. First, 
if we think that rational autonomy is the most important or “essential” feature of 
being a person—or that we are persons because of it, or in the extreme, because of it 
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alone—then other features of our lives will be thought of as less self-defining or as 
not defining at all. Even in this case, this does not mean that our relationships with 
others will be less important to us. We can see every person as being a rational 
autonomous agent in their own right, and value them as much if not more than we 
value ourselves.6 Second, as an activity, how we reason and choose to navigate our 
way through this world is as dynamic as the social roles we embody. Whether we 
think of our core selves in terms of our capacity to think and (freely) choose, or in 
terms of our capacity to form meaningful relationships, both are reasonable (although 
I think partial) interpretations of what actually makes us persons.    
I believe our capacity for rational autonomous thought is fundamental to our 
personhood, but it is only part of a more comprehensive sense of subjectivity that 
serves as the basis for our experience as individuals, which will be discussed in the 
following section. For current purposes, I agree with Rosemont’s claim that the 
rational autonomous self is a concept, but the social roles we embody are also 
concepts—or ways to think of ourselves as mothers, sisters, spouses, teachers, 
citizens, friends, etc. Others socialize us according to their roles, and many 
experiences we have because of these others end up being formative to our 
development as persons—that is, they are essential to our identity. As we continue to 
mature, our roles and their correlative responsibilities continue to establish who we 
are in relation to others. The capacity for such development is as essential to our 
identity as persons as is the capacity for autonomous thought.  
Distinguishing the rational and relational capacities from their applications is 
helpful here. Our capacity for autonomous thought and our capacity for embodying 
roles are both uniquely and universally human. These capacities individualize us 
however—or make us the particular persons that we become over the course of our 
lives—only in being put into practice. Having the capacities by themselves is not 
sufficient to establish who I am, or who you are, or who anybody is in their uniquely 
embodied, personal mode. That is, the capacities are generically human, but they also 
have inherently formative powers meant to be put into practice. Before that, we are 
nothing more than generic persons with no distinctive personal identity at all.  
To sum up: the capacity for rational autonomy and the capacity for embodying 
roles are both necessary to establishing personhood in general. But how each of us 
does this in the context of culture and in the course of our own lives is what 
individuates us. Moreover, we transform our “selves” and the world we live in by 
putting these capacities into practice. In other words, self-construction is an 
interactive, dynamic process that is part of a larger world-constructive process. For 
example, consider how the notions of being a member of a family, or having a gender 
as opposed to a sex, have changed over the years and across the globe. Also consider 
                                                
6 Consider the love and commitment that parents routinely have for their children. Even though we in 
the West tend to see ourselves as fundamentally capable of free thought and action, that does not mean 
that we value that capacity more than we value our children. Similarly, as we will see later on, the 
Western tendency to think individualistically does not necessarily lead to greater selfishness. In fact, 
people who fundamentally believe that they derive their personal meaning and worth from others may 
have expectations of those others to live an accomplished life because it reflects well on them.   
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the personal and social impact that gender-nonconforming or LGBTQ (etc.) identities 
have had, as well as how they have changed and continue to do so.7 Most importantly, 
rational autonomy and the embodiment of roles function interdependently. That is, 
how we develop our roles and execute our responsibilities will be shaped by how we 
think (e.g., about the roles themselves), and how we think will be shaped by the 
people and events that have been formative to our development. Rational autonomy 
by its moral nature has profound social applicability, while roles are social constructs 
that we can embody as well as reasonably critique, and even change.   
In a moral context, the pressure that individuals and groups bring to bear to 
accommodate their needs and interests is in part how culture is changed. When 
everything is going smoothly, or when complaints are few and changes occur in a 
spontaneous and harmonious manner, then all is well. This is Confucius’ vision of the 
good life. However, when something is identified as a social problem in need of 
change, the group (of individuals) holding that view will not agree that harmony is 
the best course of action if it serves to maintain the status quo. Without good reason, 
they could not make a case for why some of the li8 禮 or ritualized customs of their 
culture—that still help maintain social stability and privilege for a majority but at the 
expense of a smaller or less powerful group—need to change.9 Without autonomy, 
they would not be able to think for themselves, think critically, or see their interests10 
as having intrinsic value even when elements of the larger society do not see them 
that way. Rational autonomy allows us to have our own reasons for wanting things to 
change in a way that grounds the interests of people not equally protected by 
mainstream culture. Because of it, we can determine for ourselves how we want 
things to be as well as how best to make that happen, even if this challenges current 
                                                
7 Personal identity may be constructed out of an interaction between already existing private personal 
experiences and the social identification of that kind of experience. For example, some have claimed 
that homosexuals do not exist in their society, and now in some of those (such as China) 
homosexuality is on the rise, in part because people now have a way of identifying certain preferences 
or practices as being “gay”, or “lesbian”, or “bisexual”, etc. An identity may not (fully) exist until it is 
socially defined as being (thus). Similarly, a social problem may not (fully) exist until identified as 
being a “problem”. For example, one may claim that sexism does not exist in her culture because 
“sexism” is not a working concept in that culture. But does that mean that no preferences or practices 
would count as sexist, just because they have not been identified as such? A society can change its 
normative structure according to some social construct only after it has come on the scene, but it does 
not follow that the concept would have no application once put into practice.  
8 Li 禮 is translated as “ritual propriety” by Ames and Rosemont in their translation of The Analects of 
Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (Ames & Rosemont 1998). 
9 I cover this topic in my article, “Emotions, Ethics, and Equality: Humanity (Rén仁) as ‘True Moral 
Feeling’” in Dimensions of Moral Agency (Boersma 2014, 61-96). Rén仁 has various translations; to 
name a few: benevolence, nobility, humanity, humaneness, human-heartedness, humanity at its best, 
compassion, love, and authoritative conduct (Ames and Rosemont’s translation in the Analects). It is 
the most important “human” virtue, according to Confucius. 
10 This would include being an “ally”, or having an interest in helping to support or protect the interests 
of those in a less privileged group. 
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embodied values and norms.11  Rational autonomy invests persons with a critical 
moral capacity that must be put into practice to pursue its moral aim. Thus, the 
capacity for rational autonomous thought and critical thinking as a moral activity are 
interdependently connected. 
 
5.  THE SELF AS A PRAGMATIC, INTERACTIVE CONCEPT 
 
I hold that the Western individualistic concept of self that is taken to be devoid of 
context and content (the one Rosemont condemns as fictitious and dangerous) is off 
base and needs to be redefined. To begin, our pervasive sense of subjectivity, which 
is the basis for experiencing ourselves as being individuals, is a function of the 
consciousness we embody. This broader phenomenological experience of our own 
subjectivity entails rational autonomy, but it contains much more than that. For 
instance, we are aware of ourselves as being the subject of a range of different 
emotions. We are aware of experiencing various changes connected with living, 
growing, and dying; changes that more often than not occur without our voluntary, 
rational and autonomous consent. We are also essentially and profoundly aware of the 
people we care about, and less so, of those who we end up sharing a world with (also 
usually fortuitously). Some of the most important “facts” about this world concern the 
people we are closest to, or who have been the most formative in our lives. The more 
that people and events are formative in our lives, the more essential they will be to 
establishing who we are as persons.  
Thus, the core self as I see it entails two features that interdependently give rise to 
the uniquely human experience of oneself as a particular subject in a world 
necessarily populated with otherness. Together, they comprise one overall self-and-
world-constructive activity that we may separate only for the purpose of analysis. I 
will now more fully explain this new account of self where the so-called 
individualistic and social features of our “selves” are both necessary, mutually 
interactive aspects of personhood.  
 What does the “individual self” meant to me? What do I mean when I refer to 
myself, such as by using these very pronouns? I am referring to my own embodied 
awareness of being a subject of experience in a world with other such subjects. 
Embodied consciousness is necessarily linked to otherness; to people, places, things, 
perceptions, memories, desires, thoughts, emotions, etc., that make up the distinct 
phenomenological content of each person’s experience. Moreover, the consciousness 
we embody gives each of us a sense of being a distinct subject of experience, that 
                                                
11 Li 禮 or “ritual propriety” is the Confucian term for the embodied values that are practiced by one’s 
culture and that promote harmonious human interaction. To be li禮 those values are enacted and are 
not just dormant dispositions to act. My point is that human interactions may on moral grounds need to 
involve friction and even protest if harmony is achieved at the expense of a marginalized minority. 
That is, I read rén 仁 or “human flourishing” to include the idea that greater social unity may be 
achieved over time by a greater inclusivity brought about by morally justified social conflict and 
change (see footnote 9). 
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now we can identify as being our own.12  We are aware that other such persons 
populate our world too; that they are subjects of their own experience as we are of our 
own. Essentially, the self serves this pragmatic function, for embodied consciousness 
interdependently links us to the people, places, and events that it brings to our 
awareness. Thus, the “individual self” consists of embodied consciousness that is 
itself essentially and inescapably social—filled with the people and events that 
meaningfully make up our world. As such, we cannot be persons without finding 
ourselves in a world of otherness.13 
 
6.   THE PROBLEM CLARIFIED: 
THE SELF CONCEIVED AS A FALSE DICHOTOMY 
 
As Rosemont warned, we should be cautious of the pitfalls of having an overly 
individualistic view of self. But we should also be cautious of the problems with 
having an overly social view of self. Right away though, we must see that the 
distinction between “individual (e.g., rational autonomous) self” and “social (role-
bearing) self” is inaccurate, since the consciousness we embody is necessarily outer-
directed or linked to the persons and events (etc.) that it brings to our awareness. 
This is not to present a deterministic view where the content of our experience could 
not be otherwise. Rather, the experiences that have been the most formative or 
personally defining become part of our “core,” whether or not those experiences 
could have been different.  
 The problem that this discussion has brought to our attention, results from the fact 
that the West has had a long tradition of defining personhood in terms of generic 
capacities, one’s that we all possess such as rational autonomy, while China has had a 
long tradition of defining personhood in terms of actual roles and practices that 
persons embody. The West has focused on features that make us who we are in-and-
of-ourselves instead of ones socially conferred upon us by others. This difference is 
based on China being more practical in its philosophical and cultural orientation, 
while the West has been more abstract in the sense that generic human capacities that 
we share more or less “equally” have been the main focus. 
 The main problem in both cases lies in conceiving of personal identity 
exclusively: as either being a function of capacities or (used in the exclusive sense) as 
                                                
12 Having even profound experiences is not the same as identifying what those experiences are, or what 
they mean to us. This more active process of identification entails (1) that we reflect on our 
experiences and (2) that we name them or make them explicit to ourselves. Both (1) and (2) involve 
interpretation and evaluation. Having a self or being a person is not just imposed from the outside; 
(e.g.) in virtue of the social roles and responsibilities conferred upon us by our culture. Part of building 
a self involves how we ourselves want to be identified by others. 
13 Using the language of “otherness” may bring out our sense of being distinctive, separate and even 
alienated from others, rather than being essentially connected to them. To this I would say that some of 
our relationships are more impersonal than others, and these are the ones that we may not see as being 
vital to who we are as persons or as relevant to our identity at all. The closer we are to others, the more 
of a personal connection we have with them, the more likely and appropriately we will use terms of 
endearment and intimacy to describe them.  
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being a function of the active processes these capacities make possible. Casting the 
matter in this way creates a false dichotomy where the capacities and practices 
essential to actually being a person are thought to be opposed to one another instead 
of as being mutually interactive. We have capacities in order for them to be put into 
practice, and we could do nothing at all without them. More specifically, our capacity 
for moral agency only functions in virtue of being “activated”.14 If not cultivated or 
put into practice, the innate formative power of personhood can bear no moral fruit. 
In effect, no person (or at least no good person) can develop at all.15 
 What might result positively from giving moral priority to the more generic 
capacities that we all have intrinsically and regardless of our social differences? Or 
what benefits may accrue from thinking of our identity as something we possess in-
and-of-ourselves rather than as something conferred upon us by others? Rosemont 
sees only the problems, but focusing on the “abstract individual” serves as the basis 
for the correlative notions of self-governance (Kant) and self-ownership (Locke) that 
gave rise, for example, to the concept of equal rights that aims to uniformly protect 
all “individuals” insofar as they are thought to count as persons. What might be a cost 
of giving moral priority to such intrinsic capacities when it comes to identity 
formation? Privileging the intrinsic or “internal” features of self may promote an 
inward focus on one’s own conscious experience at the expense of being considerate 
of others. This may generate selfishness and social alienation that undermines one’s 
sense of belonging. In other words, committing ourselves to others as if they were a 
vital part of us may be undermined, which in turn undermines our sense of 
connection to them and our sense of belonging in the world. This is Rosemont’s 
worry. 
 What might result positively from giving moral priority to the practices through 
which the self is socialized? Privileging a concept of self, defined in terms of 
embodied social roles and responsibilities, promotes an outward focus that aims to 
benefit others. Focusing our attention on others—especially on how we can benefit 
them—tends to generate greater social harmony and commitment to human 
flourishing in general (rén仁). Our sense of belonging is also enhanced by seeing our 
identity formation as being dependent upon helping others thrive, instead of as being 
established independently by reasoning according to some universal moral principle.  
What might be a cost of giving moral priority to the personal interactions and 
social practices that establish us socially? Conceiving of identity in terms of social 
roles runs the risk of nepotism, elitism, sexism, racism, and other social problems that 
arise from denying full humanity to others due to social differences, instead of seeing 
them as possessing intrinsic value and equal worth. My being a person because of you 
                                                
14 Mencius’ (or Mengzi’s) account of human nature is not unlike my pragmatic account in this regard: 
the “seeds”, “sprouts”, or “beginnings” of moral virtue need to be “activated”, i.e., cultivated by 
culture and upbringing, or they simply die. As with my account, morally good actions grow out of the 
inherent activity of the “seed” as it is formed or given shape through learning (Mengzi, 2A.6). 
15 Notice on my interactive view of self, that we are unique or distinctive even though we may embody 
like roles or may think along similar lines. Here again, a false dichotomy is created by conceiving of 
the “universal” and the “diverse” as mutually exclusive instead of as mutually entailing.  
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may also motivate me to care about you only because it helps me build a better, more 
socially respectable self.16 This can lead to a kind of selfishness resulting from a lack 
of critical examination of the roles themselves (e.g., who the relationships actually 
benefit and how).  
The Confucian problem of defining personhood in terms of social roles instead of 
rational autonomy is this: being a “good” rén仁 person only requires that we embody 
our roles well, in part so we can help others to flourish in their socially prescribed 
roles too. But whether this is a good thing remains to be seen. In short, Confucianism 
lacks an explicit mechanism whereby we reflect on and critically evaluate the 
legitimacy of the roles themselves, including the ethic or normative structure that 
each implies.17 Confucianism can look to the West for guidance here, where critical 
analysis and the individual worth of persons are central to its mission.  
The Western problem of identifying personhood in terms of rational autonomy 
instead of social roles is this: being a “good” rational and autonomous person only 
requires that we think critically and act freely, in order to protect those very qualities 
conceived as the basis for self-determination. But then social roles are only 
contingent facts about us (Rosemont’s criticism), or the others who have been 
essential to our personal development are not seen as essential at all. As moral beings 
though, our personhood depends on our cultivating the rén仁 humanity that binds us 
to each other. The West can look to Confucianism for guidance here, since social 
roles and their correlative responsibilities to others are central to its mission. 
To conclude, the costs of both mainstream Western and Confucian views of 
personhood increase, the more extreme or exclusive they are; that is, where innate 
capacities and the activities they give rise to are conceived as being mutually opposed 
to one another instead of as functioning interdependently. We can think of ourselves 
as rights-bearing and as role-bearing,18 once we realize that the embodied awareness 
with which we develop an identity is essential to the identity we construct, and the 
identity we construct is essentially filled with social content. 19  Our social lives 
provide the context out of which our identities are constructed, and embodied 
consciousness provides the medium through which they are constructed. 20  Both 
embodied self and the world it brings to life are essential, interactive aspects of what 
it means to be a person. As for Rosemont’s specific complaint, once we understand 
that rational autonomy and social roles are both socially constructed or different ways 
                                                
16 The Analects of Confucius (6:30) speaks to how becoming an “authoritative” or rén 仁 person 
depends on helping others establish themselves (as persons). The implied motive is mainly to help 
other flourish as persons.  
17 I address this topic more fully in my responses to Nkiru Nzegwu’s “How if At All is Gender 
Relevant to Comparative Philosophy” (Nzegwu, Bockover, Chaudhuri and Femenias 2016, my 
responses: 83-87, 101-106). 
18  Rosemont discusses this tension in “Right-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons”, his 
contribution to Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility, my collection of essays dedicated to Herbert 
Fingarette (Bockover 1991, 71-101). 
19 This is critical; the more formative persons or experiences are in our lives, the more they must be 
counted in “what and who we are as persons”.  
20 A key implication here is that the embodied self is social in nature. 
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to think about what it means to be a person (with both positive and negative effects), 
then we can see them as the pragmatic devices that they are—as ideas that we can use 
to further our interests, whatever we may conceive those to be. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (1987, reprinted twice) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1.13.  
Bhagavad Gita, trans. Eknath Easwaran (2008, 2nd ed., 2nd printing) (The Blue 
Mountain Center of Meditation: Nilgiri Press), 2.11-53.  
Bockover, Mary I. (1991), Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to 
Herbert Fingarette, (note: Henry Rosemont, Jr.’s article is cited, “Rights-Bearing 
Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons) (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co.), 71-
101.  
Boersma, David (2014), Dimensions of Moral Agency, (note: Mary I. Bockover’s 
article cited, “Emotions, Ethics, and Equality: Humanity (Ren仁) as ‘True Moral 
Feeling’”) (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 61-36.  
Buddha Gotama, Majjhima Nikaya, trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi 
(2015), The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the 
Majjhima Nikaya, (Somerville: Wisdom Publications), 1.22.   
Chandler, Marthe and Littlejohn, Ronnie (eds.) (2008), Polishing the Chinese Mirror: 
Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr., (note: this is a volume in the ACPA 
Series of Chinese and Comparative Philosophy) (New York: Global Scholarly 
Publications), 127-45.  
Descartes, Rene (1641), Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Laurence J. LaFleur 
(1960, 2nd revised edition), (note: argument cited is found in the “Second 
Meditation”) (Indianapolis & New York: The Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc.), 24.  
Hume, David (1740), A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. A. Selby-Bigge (1980, 
reprinted 2nd ed., with text revised and various readings by P. H. Nidditch) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), Part IV.VI (“Of Personal Identity”).   
Kant, Immanuel (1797), Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, 
(1964, Harper Torchbook ed.) (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.).   
Kant, Immanuel (1781), Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (1965, 
ed. first published in the USA) (New York: St. Martin’s Press), A369.  
Lun-Yu [the Analects], trans. Roger Ames & Henry Rosemont (1998, 1st hardcover 
ed.), The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: 
Ballantine Books, The Random House Publishing Group).  
Mengzi [the Mencius], trans. Bryan Van Norden (2008), Mengzi: With Selections 
from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.).  
Nzegwu, Nkiri (lead author), with Bockover, Mary I. & Chaudhuri, Maitrayee & 
Femenias, Maria Luisa (commentators) (2016), “Symposium: How (If at All) is 
Gender Relevant to Comparative Philosophy?”, Journal of World Philosophies 1 
(Winter 2016): 75-118; my responses: 83-87, 101-106.  
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 9.1 (2018)  BOCKOVER 
 
109 
Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns (1980, 
10th printing), (note: passage cited from the Republic, trans. Paul Shorey Harvard 
University Press, 1930) (Princeton: Princeton University Press), VI.486a.  
Rosemont, Henry (2015), Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the 
Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion (Lanham: Lexington 
Books).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
